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MODERN LIGHTS
SARA C. BRONIN*
This Article functions as a companion to a piece, Solar
Rights, concurrently published in the Boston University Law
Review.1 In that piece, the author analyzed the absence of a
coherent legal framework for the treatment of solar rights-
the rights to access and harness the rays of the sun. The
growing popularity of, and need for, solar collector technolo-
gy and other solar uses calls for reform.
Answering the call for reform in Solar Rights, this Article
proposes a framework within which a solar rights regime
might be developed. First, as a baseline, any regime must
recognize the natural characteristics of sunlight. Sunlight
travels in beams, often across multiple legal parcels, mean-
ing that while a solar right benefits one parcel, it also likely
burdens others. Any solar rights regime must weigh the rel-
ative value of various property interests and reject frame-
works that attempt to implement absolutist approaches. In
addition, solar rights must address topographic, latitudinal,
and other location-specific conditions. In other words, the
rules for solar rights should be flexible, drawing from water
law to combine strategies of exclusion and governance to
manage sunlight, a fugitive resource like water.
Second, in addition to accommodating the natural characte-
ristics of sunlight, solar rights must clarify both the identity
of the holder of the initial entitlement and the nature of the
* Sara C. Bronin is an Associate Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut
School of Law.
1. The title to this Article was inspired by the English "ancient lights" rule,
dating back to at least the sixteenth century, which provides for the creation of
prescriptive easements for solar access. See Prescription Act, 1832, 2 & 3 Will. 4,
c. 71, § 3 (Eng.) (codifying this rule by establishing a permanent easement for
property owners whose uninterrupted access to light lasts for twenty years). Al-
though the ancient lights rule was never adopted in the United States, a modern
approach to solar rights is needed.
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entitlement itself. In recognition of the public benefits of pro-
tecting solar access, solar rights should initially be assigned
to the party who can put the solar right to the highest social-
ly beneficial use: the solar collector owner, rather than the
potential obstructer. Along with the assignment of the initial
entitlement, and in recognition of the relativity of solar
rights, we must embrace liability rules (as opposed to proper-
ty rules), which compensate burdened landowners.
A solar rights regime that both recognizes the natural
characteristics of sunlight and adequately articulates the na-
ture of the initial entitlement may be difficult to formulate.
This Article suggests that instead of creating new legal forms
that may further complicate an already complicated task, we
rely on existing property forms within the numerus clausus.
It advocates a regime that draws from principles in water
law, sets the initial entitlement so as to produce socially
beneficial results, and adequately compensates burdened
landowners. Although much work remains to refine and
implement a functional solar rights regime, this Article aims
to restart a discussion that has remained "in the shadows"
for too long.
INTRODUCTION
It is curious that a natural resource as valuable as sun-
light-increasingly valuable in the age of the solar collector 2
and the climate change crisis-remains almost entirely unregu-
lated in the United States. Myriad laws comprehensively ad-
dress the allocation of access rights to other natural resources,
such as oil, gas, minerals, air, and water. Several other coun-
tries, including Japan and England, have successfully created
solar rights regimes. 3 Despite various informative legal models
in domestic natural resource laws and foreign solar regimes,
few jurisdictions in the United States have even attempted to
2. A solar collector is a device that converts sunlight into energy or electrici-
ty, whether such a device takes the form of photovoltaic panels, heating and cool-
ing systems, water heating systems, or otherwise.
3. See supra note 1 (describing the English rule). See generally Gail Fein-
gold Takagi, Designs on Sunshine: Solar Access in the United States and Japan,
10 CONN. L. REV. 123 (1977) (comparing the American and Japanese systems).
Ancient Roman and Greek civilizations also had such regimes. See, e.g., Borimir
Jordan & John Perlin, Solar Energy Use and Litigation in Ancient Times, 1 SOLAR
L. REP. 583, 592 (1979) ("Roman sun rooms were common enough to provoke dis-
putes over solar rights and judicial decrees to settle them.").
[Vol. 80
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develop a solar rights regime.4 Where solar rights are recog-
nized, they are often so burdensome or expensive to obtain that
property owners may not bother seeking them.5
Still more curious is our government's pursuit of policies
that encourage investment in solar collectors while simulta-
neously failing to protect these investments by recognizing so-
lar rights. For example, over two dozen states have passed tax
incentives to harness solar energy, including depreciation al-
lowances, lower tax rates for solar collectors, property or sales
tax exemptions, and income tax credits. 6  Government-
sponsored low-interest loans and grants have also been used to
generate investment in solar energy. 7 Congress has passed a
tax credit for 30 percent of expenditures for solar electric in-
stallations,8 and the 2009 federal stimulus package promises to
do much more for sustainable technologies. 9  As other
4. See generally Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (forth-
coming 2009) (critiquing express agreements, governmental allocations, and court
assignments as inadequate in light of the pressing need for solar rights, and re-
counting many scholars' similar criticisms).
5. This cost is difficult to quantify because many of the factors that comprise
cost are site-specific. Even when they do pursue solar rights, property owners
must often turn to costly and time-consuming litigation. See Franklin Gevurtz,
Comment, Obstruction of Sunlight as a Private Nuisance, 65 CAL. L. REV. 94, 106
(1977) (observing that "[t]he persistence of litigation over the obstruction of sun-
light is solid evidence of its value to society today").
6. See N.C. Solar Ctr. & Interstate Renewable Energy Council, Database of
State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.org/searchby/
index.cfm?ee=l&RE=l (last visited July 13, 2009) (select "Solar (All)" from "Select
a Technology" drop-down menu; then follow "Click Here to Search" hyperlink)
(listing thirty states with property tax incentives, twenty-three states with sales
tax incentives, and twenty states with personal tax incentives, among many other
incentive types).
7. See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, Harnessing the Sun, With Help from Cities,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/
15/science/earth/15solar.html?hp (describing how a half-dozen California munici-
palities have been experimenting with solar financing programs, such as a pro-
gram in Palm Desert, California, which lends property owners money for solar
installations, to be repaid as a part of property taxes over a twenty-year period).
8. 26 U.S.C. § 25D(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
9. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON APPROPRIATIONS,
SUMMARY: AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT CONFERENCE
AGREEMENT 4 (2009), available at http://appropriations.house.gov/pdflPress
Summary02-13-09.pdf (summarizing the various provisions in the stimulus pack-
age relating to energy efficiency technologies, including: eleven billion dollars for
research, development, and projects that would make the electricity grid more ef-
ficient and build new power lines to transmit renewable energy; six billion dollars
for loans for renewable energy power generation and transmission projects; over
six billion dollars for state and local governments to invest in improving energy
efficiency and reducing carbon emissions; and two and one-half billion dollars for
energy efficiency and renewable energy research, development, and projects). For
2009]
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commentators have recognized for decades, none of these eco-
nomic measures can convince individuals to abandon conven-
tional means of obtaining energy without legal assurance of
long-term solar rights.'0
Whatever the reason for this deficiency, the evolution and
promotion of solar collection technology suggests that it is time
to formulate a definition of, and legal framework for, solar
rights. This Article revisits the suggestions of scholars who
offered solutions to the solar rights dilemma two decades ago
but failed to convince policymakers to act.1 After considering
various alternatives, this Article proposes a flexible legal
framework that responds to physical and political realities and
maximizes efficiency among affected individuals.
As a baseline, any regime must recognize the natural char-
acteristics of sunlight. Sunlight travels in beams whose path
varies depending on the time of day. To reach a particular des-
tination, these beams often travel across multiple legal parcels.
A solar right, held by the owner of the destination parcel,
would likely require that a neighbor or neighbors refrain from
erecting any obstruction that would obstruct the path of sun-
light to the destination parcel. Accordingly, a solar rights re-
gime must recognize and balance competing interests. In addi-
tion, solar rights must address topographic, latitudinal,
geographic, and other location-specific conditions. Conse-
quently, the rules for solar rights should be flexible. In this re-
spect, we can draw from another body of natural resources law,
water law, which at least one scholar believes reflects the
the effects on the solar collector industry, see, for example, Kate Galbraith, Here
Comes the Sun. Right?, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, (N.Y. edition), at BU1, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/03/business/energy-environment/
03solar.html?em, which profiles an Oregon-based solar collector producer whose
business increased because customers took advantage of 2009 legislation that
created grants for businesses, utilities, and homeowners who install solar collec-
tors.
10. See, e.g., Janice Yeary, Energy: Encouraging the Use of Solar Energy-A
Needs Assessment for Oklahoma, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 136, 139 (1983) ("Product
standards and tax credits will not influence consumers to give up conventional
energy sources and rely on solar renewable energy unless there is genuine assur-
ance of continuing access to the power source, the sun.").
11. See COLLEEN MCCANN KETTLES, FLA. SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH & EDUC.,
SOLAR AMERICA BOARD FOR CODES AND STANDARDS REPORT: A COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEW OF SOLAR ACCESS LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2008), available at
http://www.solarabcs.org/solaraccess/Solaraccess-full.pdf (reporting that "[d]uring
the height of the 1978-1985 tax credits for solar energy equipment, a host of ar-
ticles and books were published promoting solar conscious land use planning,"
which were "not widely adopted").
884 [Vol. 80
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future of property law, in part because it deals with "the most
thoroughly advanced form of property," water. 12 Water law has
developed differently around the country: one regime in the
East, where water is abundant, and another regime in the
West, where water is scarce. 13 Water law, which has long in-
corporated strategies of exclusion and governance to rank and
manage different uses, can inform a flexible approach to solar
law.
In addition to accommodating the natural characteristics
of sunlight, solar rights must clarify both the identity of the
holder of the initial entitlement and the nature of the entitle-
ment itself. In recognition of the public benefits of protecting
solar access, solar rights should be assigned initially to the per-
son who can put the solar right to the highest socially benefi-
cial use: the solar collector user, and not the potential obstruc-
tor.14 The ranking of uses after the solar collector use should
be clarified by each relevant jurisdiction in light of public policy
priorities.
Rather than seeking to create new legal forms, which may
further complicate an already complicated task, this Article
considers ways to protect solar rights using existing property
forms within the numerus clausus.1 5 This Article advocates a
12. Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1989).
13. See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of
Common Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 266 (1990) (describing the
riparian rules of the eastern states, whose inhabitants used a plentiful water
supply primarily for power-rather than consumptive uses-and the prior appro-
priation rules of the western states, where water was scarcer and the need for
bright-line rules greater). But see WELLS A. HUTCHINS, HAROLD H. ELLIS & J.
PETER DEBRAAL, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 1
(2004) (identifying seventeen states which utilize prior appropriation but observ-
ing that only eight of these states rejected riparian principles altogether, suggest-
ing that broad generalizations about the geographic generalizations relating to
the two regimes oversimplifies reality).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 101-04 (discussing the policy justifica-
tion for giving preference to solar collection).
15. This term, popularized by an article by Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E.
Smith, refers to the limited number of standard forms that are used in property
law, as opposed to contract law, which allows a nearly infinite number of ar-
rangements between willing parties. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Op-
timal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle,
110 YALE L. J. 1, 3-4 (2000) (translating this phrase as "the number is closed" and
stating that "with respect to the legal dimensions of property, the law generally
insists on strict standardization"); see also Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization
and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1604-09 (2008) (listing
numerous property forms relating to different strands of property law, including
possessory interests, servitudes, trusts, and intellectual property).
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regime that draws from principles in water law, sets the initial
entitlement so as to produce socially beneficial results, and
adequately compensates burdened landowners. Part I clarifies
how the natural characteristics of sunlight must guide any so-
lar rights regime. Part II then addresses the allocation of the
initial entitlement and looks to water law for background prin-
ciples that may guide the assignment of the initial entitlement
in solar rights regimes. Part III suggests possible integrations
of existing property forms to better allocate solar rights, focus-
ing on the questions of liability rules and adequate compensa-
tion. Although much work remains to be done to refine and
implement any solar rights regime, this Article aims to restart
a discussion that has remained "in the shadows" for too long.
I. RECOGNIZING FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
SUNLIGHT
To be effective, solar rights must recognize and respond to
sunlight's natural qualities. Sunlight can be characterized in
many ways, often seemingly contradictory: as diffuse particles
falling from the sky or as a beam following a predictable path;
as a one-time emission from the sun or as a convertible and
reusable form of energy; as an unlimited resource or as a scarce
commodity. With respect to solar rights, the most relevant
quality of sunlight is the manner in which it travels to the
earth and reaches a particular parcel. Because the earth tilts
and rotates, sunlight may never hit the same parcel in pre-
cisely the same way during the course of a single year. Even if
two different parcels share the same latitudinal coordinates,
sunlight may fall differently on each, depending on their re-
spective topographies. Just as significantly, because no part of
the United States lies on the earth's equator, sunlight never
follows a direct vertical path and must travel across at least
one other parcel to reach another.
The physical path of sunlight has two implications with re-
spect to developing a solar rights regime. First, it implies that
a relative approach-one that recognizes that a solar right al-
most always benefits one property owner at the expense of
another, and then balances these interests against one
another-may be more appropriate than the Blackstonian ab-
solutism of natural rights theory, which asserts that certain
[Vol. 80
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rights are unconditional. 16 Second, a solar rights regime must
be flexible enough to accommodate natural variations in sun-
light's pathways, including variations in time, topography, lati-
tude, and other site-specific factors. As seen in water law, such
flexibility may be more readily achievable in regimes that com-
bine dual strategies of governance and exclusion. This Part
draws from both water law and natural rights theory to argue
that solar rights must embody both relativity and flexibility. 17
A. Relativity
An introduction to the physical needs of the typical solar
collector helps to illustrate why a solar rights regime must em-
brace the principle of relativity. To collect sunlight, solar col-
lectors must face the sun: in the United States, they point in a
southerly direction and operate at a tilt within ten degrees of
the latitude of the location.18 Sunlight enters the collector via
a transparent panel (usually glass or plastic), which covers the
surface of the collector. After passing through this panel, the
sunlight then reaches the intricate mechanical systems-tubes,
plates, and the like-which actually convert the sunlight into
heat or electricity. 19  Efficient solar collectors demand an
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1323 (7th ed. 1999) (defining a "natural right"
as "[a] right that is conceived as part of natural law and that is therefore thought
to exist independently of rights created by government or society, such as the
right to life, liberty, and property").
17. See also ALAN S. MILLER ET AL., SOLAR ACCESS AND LAND USE: STATE OF
THE LAW 14 (1977) (stating that, generally, "[a] good law should: ... [h]ave a
built-in flexibility to adapt to the availability of new technologies; . . . [b]e politi-
cally acceptable; [and] [p]rovide for all types of property zones").
18. See Stephen B. Johnson, State Approaches to Solar Legislation: A Survey,
1 SOLAR L. REP. 55, 112 (1979) ("A general rule for proper collector tilt (vertical
angle) is that it should equal the site latitude plus or minus 10'. Collectors should
be aimed at true south, plus or minus 20*."); Dennis L. Phelps & Richard R. Yox-
all, Solar Energy: An Analysis of the Implementation of Solar Zoning, 17
WASHBURN L.J. 146, 148 (1977) (stating that "[v]ery litle [sic] of the sunlight col-
lected by solar energy systems approaches the collectors at a direct vertical; ra-
ther, solar collectors are commonly placed at an angle").
19. See Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, U.S. Dep't of Energy,
Technologies: Solar Collectors, http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/solar/shIbasics_
collectors.html (last visited May 5, 2009) (describing, with diagrams, different
kinds of solar collectors and the ways they function). Some commentators have
predicted that future technology will produce solar collectors that are less depen-
dent on direct rays than current collectors, but this technology has not yet been
fully adapted for wide-scale public use. See, e.g., Don Clark, Solar Industry Gets
Aid to Fight Shade, WALL ST. J., June 30, 2008, at B6 (revealing that National
Semiconductor aims to announce technology "designed to sharply reduce the im-
pact of partial shading on solar panels" by lowering the minimum threshold of vol-
2009]
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unobstructed line-of-sight path to the sun.20 The sun, however,
never shines directly above any piece of property in the United
States, with Hawaii at midday coming closest to vertical inci-
dence.2 1 A solar right only has value, then, if the owner of a so-
lar collector can enforce the right against the owners of any
other parcels over which the sunlight travels.
If solar rights must be enforceable against neighboring
parcels, protecting splar access will necessarily restrict bur-
dened landowners' rights. Restricting the rights of neighboring
parcels may be fully justified as a matter of policy, just as we
accept that property owners must abide by restrictions con-
tained in zoning ordinances or anti-pollution statutes, which
are intended to advance public aims. Water law, too, embraces
a relative approach, with the rights given to some constricting
the rights of others.22 Imposing burdens typically demands,
however, that burdened landowners are protected by pro-
cedural safeguards, by the awarding of compensation, or by
both. With respect to procedural safeguards, psychological
studies have indicated that process may supersede outcomes
tage needed for a panel's inverter to operate and indicating that other companies
are developing microinverters which convert electricity in such a way that the
underperformance of one panel does not harm the output of the others); Tubular
Sunshine, ECONOMIST, Oct. 11, 2008, at 110 (describing the efforts of four firms to
produce solar collectors, including panels of multidirectional tubes, which can cap-
ture and convert diffuse light for energy).
20. By "efficient," I mean solar collectors with minimum levels of cost payback
and energy efficiency; owners of permanently inefficient solar collectors are not
entitled to a right.
21. See Adrian J. Bradbrook, Future Directions in Solar Access Protection, 19
ENVTL. L. 167, 168 (1989) ("Except in tropical latitudes at midday and during cer-
tain times of the year only, the sun is never directly overhead at any location. For
this reason, solar rays reaching a solar device on a user's land must pass through
the sky-space of neighboring properties.").
22. See Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 1545 ("The private water user's action is
now a matter of public concern. Water rights may be private rights, but their ex-
ercise is public business. One water user is related to others in a complex web of
mutual dependencies."). Professor Freyfogle has gone so far as to claim that the
whole body of property law may follow the increasing relativity of water law, with
traditional property law concepts like exclusion playing a lesser role. See id. at
1531 ("If property law does develop like water law, it will increasingly exist as a
collection of use-rights, rights defined in specific contexts and in terms of similar
rights held by other people. Property use entitlements will be phrased in terms of
responsibilities and accommodations rather than rights and autonomy."). But see
Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 456 (2008) (emphasizing that Freyfogle's perspective is limited
because it does not account for the exclusionary nature of property rights). This
Article applies to solar rights Professor Smith's view that minimal exclusion and




(that is, wins or losses) in importance, and that people are will-
ing to accept an unfavorable outcome if they believe the process
has considered their interests.23 A solar rights regime should
set out a process that clearly indicates how interests of the
burdened landowners are taken into account. Regarding com-
pensation, which is considered later in this Article, it may be
enough to say here that burdened landowners might feel less
aggrieved if they are compensated for their losses.24 As the
development of any new property rights regime is likely to
encounter opposition from stakeholders who may not benefit
under such a regime, the development of appropriate safe-
guards or compensation requirements may be of particular
practical importance.
Of course, political expediency-avoiding the threat of pro-
tests by burdened landowners-is not the only rationale for a
relative approach to solar rights. Another way to determine if
a relativist or balancing approach makes sense is to consider
the alternative view: an approach rooted in natural rights
theory. Natural rights have been defined as inherent, univer-
sal rights that are justified outside of law but may nonetheless
find expression in the law.25 Certain aspects of property own-
ership have long been recognized as natural rights, created
upon the assumption of ownership. The Latin doctrine, cujus
est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad infernos, translated as
"whoever owns the soil owns everything up to the sky and
down to the depths,"26 has served as the fundamental expres-
sion of natural property rights codified in Roman, Jewish,
German, and French law.27 Under this concept, property own-
ership extends from the earth and minerals beneath the sur-
face to the highest usable airspace. 28 The extent of ownership
23. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 72-74 (2006) (citing
various studies and stating that "[clitizens' reactions to government decisions and
allocations have . . . been linked to the fairness of the procedures used to distri-
bute outcomes").
24. See infra Part III.B.
25. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property
Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1568 & n.72 (2003) (describing property itself as
a natural right-"inherent, prepolitical, and prelegal ... because its pursuit se-
cures a wide range of natural goods"-and arguing that property rights "must
cover the full range of rights associated with property").
26. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1628 (7th ed. 1999) (providing the translation).
27. See Ralph E. Becker, Jr., Common Law Sun Rights: An Obstacle to Solar
Heating and Cooling?, 3 J. CONTEMP. L. 19, 22 (1976) (describing this history of
natural rights as background for a discussion about solar rights).
28. But see United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946) (describing
limitations on airspace).
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is nonvolitional and nonnegotiable, and only an express altera-
tion or limitation on ownership will change the applicable
rights. A corollary of the ad coelum principle is the notion that
property owners have the right to enjoy their property in its
natural condition. 29 Unless the owned property is located un-
derground-say, a mineral estate-access to sunlight is a part
of its natural condition. Accordingly, some scholars have con-
sidered solar access to be a natural right worthy of protection,
at least in fee or surface estates. 30
The idea that access to sunlight might be considered a
natural right attached to property ownership has intuitive ap-
peal. One could argue that the right to use the land in its nat-
ural condition should include the right to access the sunlight
naturally falling upon it. There are, however, a number of ob-
vious problems with placing solar rights among natural rights.
Most significantly, the right to access sunlight conflicts with
the most established natural rights: any burdened property
owner's right to use her property ad coelum.31 A solar rights
regime could not simply state that each property owner is en-
titled to sunlight as a natural right because two property own-
ers may be fighting for the same solar pathway. In addition,
the notion that access to sunlight can be considered a natural
right is complicated by the fact that what constitutes produc-
tive, valuable access to sunlight may depend greatly on the
natural condition of the parcel and the surrounding property. 32
Even the staunchest proponents of natural rights theory have
admitted that it cannot be deployed to resolve all problems. 33
29. See J.B. Ruhl, The "Background Principles" of Natural Capital and Eco-
system Services-Did Lucas Open Pandora's Box?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
525, 534-35 (2007) (discussing scholars' approaches toward natural rights with
respect to nuisance law, which the author argues might have developed in a way
that would promote natural capital and ecosystem services, and advocating that a
set of natural rights should protect "a landowner's use of land in its natural condi-
tion").
30. See, e.g., John Edward Cribbet, Concepts in Transition: The Search for a
New Definition of Property, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 17 (differentiating nonvoli-
tional rights from volitional rights-rights created by an affirmative act, such as
easements, licenses, and covenants).
31. To be sure, the ad coelum principle has been limited in a number of im-
portant respects; for example, the Supreme Court has said that property owners
cannot exclude airplanes from flying a reasonable distance overhead. Causby, 328
U.S. at 263-64.
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See, e.g., Claeys, supra note 25, at 1569 ("[M]embers of society do not en-
joy a natural right to every conceivable power of disposition, use, or control that
they might enjoy if they had no neighbors.").
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Furthermore, conceptualizing solar rights as a subset of
natural rights fails to accommodate the balancing of competing
interests that a solar rights regime must consider. In rejecting
natural rights, some scholars have embraced an alternate view
that economics alone should drive the allocation of solar rights
and that legal regimes should aim to maximize value for prop-
erty owners. 34 It is true, of course, that competing solar access
claims may raise significant economic valuation issues. How-
ever, focusing purely on an economic approach may go too far
in the other direction as we seek to prioritize the development
of renewable sources of energy.
B. Flexibility
The physical nature of sunlight demands that solar rights
regimes be not only relative but also flexible. Returning to the
physical requirements of the solar collector may help guide
what kind of flexibility is warranted. One might define such
requirements by defining a "solar skyspace"-the three-
dimensional space necessary for reasonable operation of a solar
collector. 35 The scope of the solar skyspace may depend on
topography: in hilly areas, the south-facing side of a hill may
require more protection than the north-facing side because in
the earth's northern hemisphere, light from a southerly direc-
tion is stronger and thus more useful for solar collectors than
diffuse northern light.36 It may also be affected by times and
34. See Stephen F. Williams, Solar Access and Property Rights: A Maverick
Analysis, 11 CONN. L. REV. 430, 431 (1979) (advocating for changes that "are as
effective as they might be in bringing about the maximization of the value of all
the resources at stake when solar access is in conflict with other land uses" by
asking "what set of rules would be likely to bring about the mix of land uses that
an intelligent owner of all the affected parcels would select"). But see Dale D.
Goble, Solar Access and Property Rights: Reply to a "Maverick"Analysis, 12 CONN.
L. REV. 270, 271 (1979) (calling Williams's "[w]elfare economics ... a branch of
theology").
35. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-907 (2008) (defining solar skyspace as "the
space between a solar energy collector and the sun which must remain unob-
structed in order to assure reasonable operation of the solar energy system"); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 34-40-1(2) (2008) (defining solar skyspace as "the space between a
solar energy system and the sun which must remain unobstructed such that on
any given clear day of the year, not more than ten percent (10%) of the collectible
insolation shall be blocked").
36. J.M. Guldmann, Solar Energy & Access to Sunlight: An Optimization
Model of Energy Supply and Land-Use Design, 12 ENV'T & PLAN. A 765, 774
(1980) ("Topography will influence the spatial extent of the shadows: these will be
less of a problem on the slopes that face towards the south than on those that face
towards the north.").
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dates, as the sun emits more light around the noon hour in the
summer than at twilight in the winter.37 These considerations
are particularly important in view of the fact that solar collec-
tors have different energy-producing (or income-generating)
capabilities depending on the characteristics of the land on
which they are located.38 Accordingly, there must be flexibility
in solar rights within a single jurisdiction, and from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction.39 The same rules cannot fairly apply to
hilly and flat areas or urban (dense) and non-urban locations;
nor can they be applied in the same way at all times and dates
throughout the year. But how do we achieve such flexibility by
and across jurisdictions?
Perhaps the best model for a flexible response to a natural
resource is water law, which exists throughout the country in a
variety of forms addressing the differing physical manifesta-
tions of water.40 Water law has been considered by many legis-
37. Id. at 767 ("With respect to intradaily variations, it is clear that the solar
intensity will be at a maximum at about midday and at a minimum at the times
of sunset and sunrise. The total daily amount of energy that strikes a collector
varies according to the seasonal changes in the declination; and the pattern of
variations depends on the collector angle."). Several statutes defining solar sky-
space reflect these daily and seasonal variations. See, e.g., 30 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 725/1.2(e)(2)-(3) (West 2008) (noting that the term solar skypace term solar
skyspace is limited as follows: "(2) Where a solar energy system is used for heat-
ing purposes only, 'solar skyspace' means the maximum three dimensional space
extending from a solar energy collector to all positions of the sun between 9 a.m.
and 3 p.m. Local Apparent Time from September 22 through March 22 of each
year; [and] (3) Where a solar energy system is used for cooling purposes only, 'so-
lar skyspace' means the maximum three dimensional space extending from a solar
energy collector to all positions of the sun between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. Local
Apparent Time from March 23 through September 21").
38. See Barry Lee Myers, Solar Access Rights in Residential Developments, 24
PRAc. LAW. 13, 17 (1978) (suggesting that solar rights consider numerous factors,
"including the nature of potential obstructions, the changes in the solar angle that
occur on a daily and seasonal basis, the topography of the land in the develop-
ment, the size and location of the solar energy devices to be used, and the techno-
logical characteristics of the devices"); Dale D. Goble, Comment, Solar Rights:
Guaranteeing a Place in the Sun, 57 OR. L. REV. 94, 99-100 (1977) (suggesting
that sunlight, which is both variable and diffuse, has an impact on solar collectors
which varies greatly depending "primarily upon five factors: the hour of the day,
the day of the year, the atmospheric conditions, the latitude, and the altitude of
the collector").
39. Others have recognized that this is true. See, e.g., GAIL BOYER HAYES,
SOLAR ACCESS LAW: PROTECTING ACCESS TO SUNLIGHT FOR SOLAR ENERGY
SYSTEMS 2 (1979) ("There is no single 'ideal' solar access law. Different communi-
ties or parts of communities may need different legal approaches.").
40. While it may be possible to compare sunlight to oil and gas, television and
radio waves, or weather modification strategies, such comparisons have borne lit-
tle fruit. See Kevin Sean McElhenny, Common Law Remedies Applicable to Solar
Energy Obstruction in Iowa, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 435 (1979-1980) (recounting
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latures and courts and can provide useful parallels from which
an emerging solar rights regime can draw.41 The key legal is-
sue relating to both water and sunlight is use, not possession or
capture. 42 Both water and sunlight flow can be used without
necessarily depleting future capacity. 43 As Henry Smith has
argued, water law combines two strategies-exclusion and
governance-which work together to create "fluid" property
rights that differ from property rights traditionally used for
land.4 Exclusion, on the one hand, relies on boundaries, sig-
naling, and bright-line rules to give water rights holders the
power to prevent others from taking their water.45 Gover-
nance, on the other, relies on regulations or private agreements
to juggle the uses available to multiple competing parties.46
Together, governance and exclusion in water law work to allo-
cate rights to a complex fugitive resource. Reviewing several
water law regimes with the concepts of exclusion and gover-
these comparisons). After water, the second most popular analogy used for sun-
light is oil and gas. Both resources must be "captured" before their energy poten-
tial can be used, but oil and gas supplies are finite, unlike sunlight, and oil and
gas law (which focuses on leases and taxation) is probably too technical to apply to
sunlight. Bradbrook, supra note 21, at 177-78; Comment, The Allocation of Sun-
light: Solar Rights and the Prior Appropriation Doctrine, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 421,
428-29 (1976) [hereinafter Comment, The Allocation of Sunlight] (arguing that
solar rights should not be compared to oil and gas law because oil and gas law
deals with ownership (rather than use), involves highly specialized legal forms,
and is "hopelessly intermixed" with tax law).
41. John H. Lungren, Solar Entitlement: A Proposed Legislative Model, 4 J.
ENERGY L. & POL'Y 171, 184 (1983) ("Because case law has not only validated wa-
ter law legislation, but has also defined the rights of the parties, water law pro-
vides an attractive model from which to create solar access legislation.").
42. See Bradbrook, supra note 21, at 176 ("The main theoretical justification
for the analogy is that solar energy is used, rather than captured or sold. Similar-
ly, the issue in water allocation is use rather than ownership."); Carol Polis, Note,
Obtaining Access to Solar Energy: Nuisance, Water Rights, and Zoning Adminis-
tration, 45 BROOK. L. REV. 357, 368 (1979) ("A right in water is defined by use ra-
ther than by possession. Because of the analogous nature of solar energy, the en-
titlement to solar energy may also be defined in terms of use."); Debra L. Stangl,
Comment, Assuring Legal Access to Solar Energy: An Overview with Proposed
Legislation for the State of Nebraska, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 567, 601 (1978) (stat-
ing that rights in water relate to use, not ownership, as is the case with sunlight).
43. See Comment, The Allocation of Sunlight, supra note 40, at 435 (observing
that "[t]he sunlight converted to electricity ... does not diminish the continuing
future flow of sunlight to the collector" while "the hydrological cycle of equal eva-
poration and condensation assures that water is seldom 'lost,' despite variations
in its appearance").
44. Smith, supra note 22, at 466, 477.
45. Id. at 446.
46. Id.
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nance in mind may help inform the content and form of a re-
gime for rights in another fugitive resource, sunlight.
Surface water, from either ground springs or precipitation,
is similar to sunlight in that both are diffuse and can spread
across a wide area covering many individually-owned parcels.47
Rules governing the use of surface water differ greatly depend-
ing on the jurisdiction. In some areas, a "reasonable use" rule
allows landowners to use surface water in any reasonable
manner, even if the use damages neighboring properties or al-
ters the flow of water.48 Other jurisdictions follow a strict lia-
bility rule, which prohibits landowners from using water in any
way that could interfere with their neighbors' enjoyment of
their property. 49 The common enemy rule, conversely, allows
property owners to take actions that interfere with the flow of
surface water, even if such actions harm a neighboring proper-
ty owner or their property. 50 The idea behind this rule is that
runaway surface water is a "common enemy" to all property
owners, and that each property owner must fend for herself
when it comes to diverting it. The range of legal rules that
have developed with respect to surface water can shape our ap-
proach to solar rights.51 The common enemy rule-or perhaps
a "common friend" rule, if, generally speaking, property owners
view sunlight as a friend rather than an enemy-best reflects
our current approach to solar rights. Property owners in most
jurisdictions can erect any structure that interferes with the
flow of sunlight without regard to a neighbor's solar access. 52
But just as the common enemy rule has been increasingly
47. See Dean N. Alterman, Comment, Reflected Sunlight is a Nuisance, 18
ENVTL. L. 321, 328 (1987) ("Surface water comes from springs or from rain. Sun-
light comes from the sky and spreads over a wide area, like rain which diffuses
into surface water and permeates the ground it falls on. Sunlight can, therefore,
logically be treated like surface water for the purpose of determining liability for
harm from reflecting sunlight.") (footnote call number omitted).
48. See Shawn M. Lyden, An Integrated Approach to Solar Access, 34 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 367, 380 (1983-1984) (calling the reasonable use rule "the middle
ground between the civil law and common enemy rules" because 'landowners are
not totally prohibited from interfering with the natural flow of surface water, nor
are they granted a license to interfere with surface water drainage without regard
for their neighbor's interests") (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. See id. at 378-79.
50. See id. at 379.
51. See id. at 382-83 (arguing for a solar right analogous to surface water
rights because "both sunlight and surface water flow naturally across property
lines, and, when the natural path of either is altered, the interests asserted by
adjoining landowners are the same") (footnote call number omitted).
52. Bronin, supra note 4 (describing the near-absence of laws in the United
States that address or define solar access, much less protect it).
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abandoned in water law, a different approach in solar law may
be needed. The common enemy rule fails to embrace the rela-
tivity and flexibility principles that this Article argues are es-
sential to a solar rights regime. A strict liability approach to
solar law, which would prevent anyone from interfering with
the solar access of a neighboring property owner, may swing
too far in the other direction while being similarly inflexible.
Reasonable use rules present a better approach to solar rights
because they are both flexible and relative.
Just as sunlight has been analogized to surface water, sun-
light has also been analogized to watercourses, such as rivers
and streams. Both sunlight and watercourses follow defined
and predictable paths, flowing away from their sources. 53 With
respect to watercourses, as was the case with surface water, a
variety of legal rules have emerged. 54 Riparian rules allow a
property owner who abuts a watercourse to make reasonable
use of the water. 55 Whether a use is reasonable typically de-
pends on the property owner's needs, the benefit of the use, and
any injuries that might result to others.56 Although riparian
53. See Alterman, supra note 47, at 321-22. Alterman goes on to add:
The sun follows a predictable path through the sky, even though the
amount of sunlight to reach a spot depends on cloud cover and can vary
from season to season. In this respect sunlight is like a watercourse,
which also flows predictably from season to season in a defined path,
even though the amount of flow may change from day to day. As water
flows downhill (and therefore its direction can be predicted), sunlight
flows in straight lines away from its source.
Id. at 329 (footnote call numbers omitted).
54. See Gevurtz, supra note 5, at 104 (describing the English rule, which pre-
vents any change in the watercourse's natural condition, either in quantity or
quality, and asserting that "[i]f a similar rule were applied to sunlight, any ob-
struction whatsoever would be prohibited," and "[tihis result would be far too ex-
treme").
55. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "riparian
right" as "[tlhe right of a landowner whose property borders on a body of water or
watercourse" "to make reasonable use of the water"); Martha Freeman, Securing
Solar Access in Maine, 32 ME. L. REV. 439, 452-53 (1980) ("[A] riparian, or owner
of shoreline or riverbank property, has a right to the natural water flow subject to
the reasonable use of the water by all other riparians.").
56. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979) (evaluating reasona-
ble uses based on the purpose of the use, its suitability and value, and general jus-
tice principles); Polis, supra note 42, at 369 ("Entitlement to water may be further
restricted by requiring that the use itself be similar to that of the other proprie-
tors of the stream. The reasonable use rule, thus qualified, could be adapted to
protect the use of solar streams for common energy purposes."). For a critique
and explanation of the vague standards used in reasonable use jurisprudence, see
Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water
Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 264 (1990), which argues that riparian rules be-
came vaguer as more demands were placed on water, in contrast to the widely ac-
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rules appear to be a primarily governance system, they also
rely on exclusion-exclusion of property owners who do not
abut a watercourse and exclusion of certain uses from protec-
tion.57 Under riparian principles, a property owner seeking a
solar right could argue that she deserves access rights to any
sunlight that naturally flowed to her property.58 In most cir-
cumstances, as long as that property owner used the sunlight
in a way that was to some degree reasonably necessary and did
not impinge too greatly on a neighboring property owner's
rights, a decision-maker would deem the use reasonable, and
the use would be protected under riparian principles.
Alternatively, the prior appropriation doctrine governs
watercourses in a way that does not depend on property owner-
ship. To obtain water rights in a prior appropriation jurisdic-
tion, an individual must: demonstrate an intent to use the wa-
ter, give notice of such intent, comply with state laws, actually
divert water from a watercourse, and, finally, apply the di-
verted water to a beneficial use. 59 These five steps are often
codified in statutes that allow for the transferability of rights
received by those who first appropriate the water. 60 Thus in
prior appropriation jurisdictions, both exclusion and gover-
nance are combined: exclusion, in that one user is given the
right to use water to the detriment of other users, and gover-
cepted view that property rights become sharper when a resource becomes
scarcer.
57. Smith, supra note 22, at 449, 473 (arguing that "the riparian system, like
other property systems, employs exclusion as a first cut at the problem of water
overuse").
58. Alterman, supra note 47, at 329 (asserting that under riparian rules, "a
landowner should have a right to the ordinary flow of sunlight to his property").
59. Stangl, supra note 42, at 603 ("[T]he first three requirements of an appro-
priation-intent to appropriate, notice of the appropriation and compliance with
state statutes-are accomplished by following the procedures for permit applica-
tion or initiating court action. The fourth requirement is that there be an actual
diversion of the water from a natural stream .... The final requirement is that
the water be applied, with reasonable diligence and within a reasonable time, to a
beneficial use."). But see Polis, supra note 42, at 371 (describing the rule in only
two elements: "not only must the appropriator be first in time to be first in right,
but the use of the appropriated resource must be beneficial").
60. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.040-.140 (2009) (establishing application
and notice requirements and describing how a recipient can forfeit appropriative
rights through nonuse); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-152(A) (2009) (setting forth an
application process by which appropriative rights are granted and by which par-
ties intending to make beneficial use of water are required to signal their intent to
do so by applying for a permit).
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nance, in that the usufructuary right may be routinely moni-
tored, measured, and changed.61
Many commentators have advocated for the application of
this "first-in-time, first-in-right" approach to solar rights, and
in fact several jurisdictions have experimented with it.62 Un-
der these rules, a potential solar user can apply for a permit to
guarantee that amount of access that will be beneficially
used. 63 Because physical differences exist between sunlight
and water, however, the prior appropriation rules do not apply
in exactly the same way in both contexts. Transferability in
water law regimes, for example, means that the water right
can be transferred either from one user to the other or from one
use to another. Transferability in solar rights refers to trans-
ferability to subsequent property owners, or even transfers in
uses, but does not refer to transferability between neighbors,
given the physical nature of sunlight. Despite the differences,
however, transferability is as important in solar rights regimes
as it is in water regimes. 64
A few scholars have dismissed the notion that sunlight and
water can be compared at all.65 One of the earliest commenta-
tors on the subject argued that, unlike water, whose use can be
physically measured, the extent of sunlight use is difficult to
determine. 66 Moreover, sunlight access may involve burdening
a neighbor's property, while water access might not.67 Some
61. Smith, supra note 22, at 449, 468-70 (arguing that prior appropriation,
"which is conventionally thought of as a parcelized system of private exclusion
rights, in fact relies heavily on the governance strategy").
62. See, e.g., Comment, The Allocation of Sunlight, supra note 40, at 447 (ar-
guing that because "[iun prior appropriation states, the water law is well-
developed," "[t]his body of law appears suitable for adaptation, in whole or in part,
to solar questions"). New Mexico and Wyoming draw from water law's prior ap-
propriation (first-in-time, first-in-right) approach. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-3-1
to -5 (LexisNexis 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-22-103 (2008).
63. See infra Part H.A; see also Polis, supra note 42, at 374 (suggesting that "a
solar user [using appropriative right principles] cannot enforce a greater degree of
solar access than necessary to satisfy his bona fide energy needs").
64. Cf. Freyfogle, supra note 12, at 1543 (observing that economists have crit-
icized water law for being "economically inefficient and socially undesirable" to
the extent that in some jurisdictions water rights are not easily transferable).
65. See, e.g., Bradbrook, supra note 21, at 179 ("The nature of sunlight and
the development of solar access laws should be regarded as sui generis.").
66. 7 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 340 (1926) (calling
the analogy between sunlight and water "not a very complete analogy"). Of
course, Holdsworth was not aware, in 1926, of coming technological advances that
would make measurements of sunlight commonplace.
67. See John William Gergacz, Legal Aspects of Solar Energy: Statutory Ap-
proaches for Access to Sunlight, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 19 (1982) ("U]se of
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scholars are particularly wary of applying prior appropriation
rules to sunlight because in the western states, where prior ap-
propriation has been used to govern water use, sunshine is
plentiful while water is scarce, 68 and because it may be difficult
to identify an "appropriation" of sunlight.69 Indeed, more per-
mits may be issued in a solar prior appropriation regime than
in a water regime because many individuals may take advan-
tage of sunlight without diluting it, which is not the case with
water. 70 There is also the concern that prior appropriation re-
gimes, which generally favor development, will result in a race
to appropriate sunlight. This concern arises because prior ap-
propriation can work against water conservation in jurisdic-
tions where governments reject a governance approach to
rights that have already been awarded. Farmers, for example,
have no incentive to embrace drip irrigation if governments do
not mandate ongoing anti-waste rules and if doing so will force
a forfeiture of their water rights.71 When it comes to solar
rights, at least one scholar has rightly argued that the risk of
water does not involve limiting the use of a neighbor's property .... Since the sun
changes position throughout the day and with the seasons the stream of sunlight
striking the solar collector also changes location .... Water users other than the
first user may also utilize the water. Once a sunlight access path has been allo-
cated, however, any additional solar collectors blocking that path would act as
impermissible obstructions.").
68. See Melvin M. Eisenstadt, Access to Solar Energy: The Problem and its
Current Status, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 21, 36 (1982) (admitting that
"[n]evertheless, certain water law concepts apply to the solar access problem" such
as "beneficial use, prior appropriation, and transferability").
69. Williams, supra note 34, at 448 (listing three difficulties of applying the
prior appropriation rule to sunlight: "(1) [d]ifficulties in the definition of an effec-
tive appropriation; (2) the tendency of the rule to stimulate premature develop-
ment of water supplies; and (3) a likelihood of wasteful uses"). But see Goble, su-
pra note 34, at 291-92 (expertly rebutting all of Stephen Williams's points).
70. See Bradbrook, supra note 21, at 176 (asserting that "the vagueness of the
principle of beneficial use could result in great practical difficulties"); Karin Hill-
house & William Hillhouse, New Mexico's Solar Rights Act: A Cloud Over Solar
Rights, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 751, 757 (1979) (asserting, inter alia, that "[slince each
use of sunlight is site-specific, it seems unlikely that the New Mexico ... [statute
for solar permits based on prior appropriation principles] intended to use trans-
ferability in this latter sense").
71. The California Supreme Court in 1989 attempted to remedy the problem
of rights-hoarding, at least in limited contexts, by authorizing the state board that
evaluated riparian rights to use broad discretion in ensuring that such rights
were compatible with state goals. See In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream Sys.,
749 P.2d 324, 337 (Cal. 1988) (holding that the federal government's proposed
riparian uses may be evaluated by the state "in the context of other uses and...
in light of the state's interest in promoting the most efficient and beneficial use of
the state's waters"), cert. denied, California v. United States, 488 U.S. 824 (1988).
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overdeveloping solar collectors to appropriate sunlight "seems
exaggerated and [is] worth taking."72
On the other hand, others argue that because water and
sunlight share so many physical characteristics, "the different
standards applied to water and light cannot logically be ex-
plained on the basis of the nature of the property rights in-
volved. '73 Prior appropriation rules may be especially appro-
priate in situations where two or more solar collectors are
pitted against each other. For example, one can imagine a
dense urban neighborhood in which a property owner must ele-
vate her roofline to maximize input into a solar collector. The
elevated roofline, however, may reduce the sunlight hitting the
solar collector of a neighbor. In this case, assuming that it
would be very rare for both neighbors to be simultaneously
building solar collectors, a first-in-time approach may be ap-
propriate, giving the initial entitlement to the first neighbor to
use the solar collector for its intended purpose.
At the very least, however this look at the substantive dis-
pute about applicable legal principles is resolved, water law
confirms that one size might not fit all-that it may be appro-
priate and feasible to employ different conceptual frameworks
for solar rights in different communities. Different regimes
governing water emerged in different parts of the country,
arguably because each was more suited to local conditions such
as topography, economy, and state of development. Similarly,
the age and density of a community, and the topography and
latitude of the parcel of land, can lead to variations in solar
rights. Solar rights must be flexible enough to accommodate
these variations and adapt to new ones. More broadly, solar
rights must recognize the balance between right holders and
the neighbors they burden.
72. Vernon N. Kerr, New Mexico's Solar Rights Act: The Meaning of the Sta-
tute, 1 SOLAR L. REP. 737, 744 (1979) ("Critics warn of a race to develop, either to
install a solar device before nearby property is developed or to develop property
before a solar collector can be installed by a nearby landowner.").
73. Gevurtz, supra note 5, at 105 (citing, with respect to the proposition that
courts have weighed conflicting land and water uses, Labruzzo v. Atl. Dredging &
Constr. Co., 54 So. 2d 673 (Fla. 1951) and O'Leary v. Herbert, 55 P.2d 834 (Cal.
1936)). Labruzzo dealt with a conflict between a user of subterranean water as a
spring and a neighbor whose excavation of land for the purpose of creating a basin
would interfere with such water use. Labruzzo, 54 So. 2d at 676. O'Leary, how-
ever, dealt with a conflict between the owner of a mine digging an underground
tunnel and neighbors who used an underground spring for water. O'Leary, 55
P.2d at 835.
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II. THE INITIAL ENTITLEMENT
Over the last fifty years, legal scholarship has clarified
that the assignment of an initial legal entitlement matters,
especially where one party's rights may burden another par-
ty-as is the case in the solar rights context. 74 Indeed, assign-
ing entitlements to the wrong party may lead to inefficient or
undesirable results. Before determining how to assign initial
entitlements to solar rights seekers, it is important to under-
stand, at least in brief, the theory behind entitlement assign-
ments and how this theory might apply to solar rights. As a
secondary matter, it may also be beneficial to review relevant
principles of water law that might assist in developing a solar
rights regime.
After analyzing the initial entitlement question through
theory and analogy, this Part asserts that, for policy reasons,
we should grant initial entitlements in solar rights to the party
with the most socially beneficial use. When a solar collector is
involved, the owner of the solar collector should be deemed to
have the highest socially beneficial use among all parties po-
tentially competing for conflicting solar rights. Beyond the so-
lar collector use, uses should be identified and ranked depend-
ing on the needs of the jurisdiction.
A. Entitlement Theory
In theory, the assignment of the initial entitlement in any
legal regime should not matter because the parties will always
bargain to reach the most efficient result, with the entitlement
going to the party who most values it. Ronald Coase, the scho-
lar most associated with this view, imagined a world without
transaction costs-that is, a world without the administrative,
information-gathering, monitoring, or other costs associated
with an exchange. 75 He posited that, in a world without trans-
74. The academic debate on this issue focuses on a 1960 article by Ronald H.
Coase. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
75. See David M. Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction
Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ.
L. REV. 61, 68, 84 (2005) (arguing that "the literature uses inconsistent and widely
varying definitions of transaction costs" and offering a definition of "transaction
cost[s]" as "the costs of making and enforcing both governmental and private deci-
sions"); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661,
1674-76 (1989) (recounting others' definitions of transaction costs and calling "the
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action costs, the most efficient outcome and allocation of re-
sources would result through bargaining by and among affected
parties. 76 In such a situation, a right would always end up in
the hands of the party who valued that right most.7 7
Of course, we live not in the world of Coasean theory but in
a world with transaction costs associated with the most minor
of exchanges. In the "real" world, the Coase theorem has been
read to imply that the law should aim to minimize transaction
costs. 78 As economist Robert Cooter put it, the Coase theorem
implies that "the structure of the law should be chosen so that
transaction costs are minimized, because this will conserve re-
sources used up by the bargaining process and also promote ef-
ficient outcomes in the bargaining itself. ' 79 Under this view,
the more the law can minimize transaction costs, the better the
ultimate outcomes. Cooter joins many others who, over the last
fifty years, have contributed to the voluminous literature on
Coasean bargaining by emphasizing the cost-minimization ap-
proach to law.80
Scholars' calls for cost minimization have focused the ini-
tial entitlement debate on the question of which party is likely
to value the right most-that is, the party who, in a world
without transaction costs, would have successfully bargained to
obtain the right. The rationale for this approach relies on the
possibility that bargaining will not occur or will not produce
the most efficient result. In theory, the holder of a legal right
will choose to bargain with others who want to obtain it. How-
ever, in practice, bargaining may be costly and inefficient; and
bargaining might not occur at all if there are too many parties
or if a key party chooses not to bargain. Because bargaining to
the best result is not guaranteed, it is important to determine
which party most likely deserves the entitlement at the outset.
Determining where to place the initial entitlement may be
particularly difficult with respect to solar rights, which neces-
concept of transaction costs... something of a black hole" because of the apparent
disagreement about what kinds of costs are included in the definition).
76. See Coase, supra note 74.
77. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 85 (3d ed. 2000)
(articulating this well-worn characterization of Coase's theorem). This articula-
tion of the Coase theorem has been termed the "positive" Coase theorem. Id.
78. Id. at 93. This articulation of the Coase Theorem has been termed the
"normative" Coase theorem. Id.
79. Robert Cooter, The Costs of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1982).
80. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 75, at 68 (indicating that "[tihe goal of
reducing or eliminating transaction costs has strongly influenced both scholarship
and public policy" and calling the goal ubiquitous).
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sarily benefit one party while burdening another (or others). In
the solar rights context, such disparities occur primarily be-
cause sunlight may fall across multiple parcels before reaching
its destination, with the owners of each parcel possibly being
able to make the case for a right.81 In addition to the problem
of competing rights, the number of bargaining parties-as few
as two, but (especially in urban settings) potentially many
more-presents special problems in Coasean analysis. Even a
negotiation that involves only two parties may be difficult, for
such a negotiation would arise from a bilateral monopoly-a
situation in which there is only one possible party on each side
of the transaction. Bilateral monopolies thwart efficient bar-
gaining because of the risk that one party may use her mono-
poly to extort the other or refuse to bargain altogether. As the
number of bargainers increases, so do transaction costs.8 2
Perhaps because of these difficulties, very few jurisdictions
have identified the recipient of the initial entitlement of a solar
right.83 A party wishing to install a solar collector often does
not know whether she should pay a neighbor not to exercise the
right to block her collector or whether the neighbor should pay
her for violating her right if the neighbor does block. Robert
Ellickson and others might argue that in such situations, the
assignment of the initial entitlement does not matter-even in
a world with transaction costs. Ellickson explains that private
individuals do not necessarily rely on the legal system to de-
termine their entitlements and instead make agreements with
each other without government interference, especially in
close-knit communities. 84  Accordingly, Ellickson asserts,
Coase's legal centralism ignores the realities of individuals'
bargaining on the ground.8 5 While Ellickson's critique may
hold true for close-knit communities, it does not explain the
81. See supra Part I.A.
82. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good
Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83, 91 (1978).
83. See supra text accompanying note 52.
84. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 4 (1991) (summarizing research which revealed that ranchers in a
close-knit community "achieve cooperative outcomes not by bargaining from legal-
ly established entitlements, as the parable supposes, but rather by developing and
enforcing adaptive norms of neighborliness that trump formal legal entitle-
ments").
85. Id. (explaining that in adopting the "view that the state functions as the
sole creator of operative rules of entitlement among individuals . . . Coase re-
peated a blunder that dates back at least to Thomas Hobbes").
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near absence of evidence demonstrating the existence of ex-
press agreements between neighbors-perhaps the closest of
mini-communities-allocating solar rights.
In the absence of an explicit solar rights regime, and often
lacking information about who owns the right in the first place,
parties must either bargain among themselves to create an ex-
press agreement or resolve their disputes in court. Both me-
thods may involve significant transaction costs. Express
agreements, such as express easements or covenants, require
each of the bargaining parties to invest time and money to en-
sure that required formalities are met. In court battles, legal
fees and opportunity costs can be substantial. Even where
government allocates solar rights (that is, explicitly identifies
the recipient of the initial entitlement), a solar rights seeker's
petition for such rights may be very costly.8 6 Excessive trans-
action costs in all solar rights regimes make assigning an ini-
tial entitlement all the more important.
B. Determining Initial Entitlements in Solar Regimes
As noted above, default rules, which grant entitlements at
the outset to parties who value them most, will have the effect
of reducing bargaining and thus reduce transaction costs.
However, there is an alternative view: that we should assign
the initial entitlement to the party who will use it to produce
the most socially beneficial effect. To determine how to con-
sider these possibly competing views about which users deserve
a solar right most, we might do well to review relevant prin-
ciples in an analogous area of law: water law, particularly as
applied to watercourses and streams.8 7 Because solar rights
are necessarily relative (that is, benefiting one party while
burdening another), the most salient examples from water law
are those in which one use of water is weighed against another.
In riparian jurisdictions, governed by a reasonable use ap-
proach, such weighing occurs when demand for water exceeds
supply, such as when rivers and streams begin to dry up.88 A
use that may be reasonable during a rainy season may not
86. Bronin, supra note 4, at 1218-22 (introducing and summarizing the issues
relating to transaction costs of express agreements, government allocations, and
court assignments of solar rights).
87. See Lungren, supra note 41, at 184 ("Because case law has not only vali-
dated water law legislation, but has also defined the rights of the parties, water
law provides an attractive model from which to create solar access legislation.").
88. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
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necessarily be reasonable during a drought. During a drought,
a court or decision-maker will likely distinguish between natu-
ral uses, which include uses absolutely necessary to existence,
and artificial uses, which include other uses such as irrigation
and the operation of machinery.8 9 The right to use the water
belongs, at the outset, to the riparian owner using water for
natural purposes, to the extent that the quantity of water used
is reasonable. Other riparian owners will receive water rights
in proportion to both the nature of the use (natural versus
artificial) and their reasonable need. In this way, as Carol
Rose has explained, riparian rules balance the interests of both
individual property owners and the general public in allocating
a scarce resource. 90
Riparian rules can provide some guidance for emerging so-
lar regimes, but they are not perfectly compatible. The natu-
ral-artificial distinction, for example, cannot be easily made for
solar uses: some might view solar collectors as the quintessen-
tial natural use as they form part of an alternative energy solu-
tion, which many believe is essential to human survival; others
might deem solar collector uses to be artificial, especially if a
property owner is also connected to the conventional electric
grid. Riparian rules also misalign with solar rights because so-
lar rights are relative to each other only with respect to bene-
fits and burdens, and not necessarily relative to each other
with respect to the substance of the right. In other words,
while one property owner's water usage may conflict with the
water usage of another property owner, the use of sunlight does
not necessarily compete with other uses of sunlight.91 Rather,
the use of sunlight conflicts primarily with development
goals. 92 The reasonable use approach in water law is not in-
tended to resolve disputes among property owners with very
different competing uses, as might be required in the allocation
of solar rights.93
89. Evans v. Merriwether, 4 Ill. 491, 496 (1842) (asserting the general rule
that where "there is not sufficient [water] for each proprietor living on the
stream," "the question must be left to the judgment of the jury" of whether a use is
natural or artificial).
90. Rose, supra note 56, at 265-66.
91. Gevurtz, supra note 5, at 104-05 (asserting that "in water cases the con-
flict is usually between competing uses of water, whereas in light cases, the con-
flict is between the use of land and the use of sunlight").
92. Id.
93. Polis, supra note 42, at 371 (arguing that the reasonable use rule "does
not provide a basis for resolving disputes among private parties who have dissimi-
lar use requirements, as typically occurs in urban areas").
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Although the reasonable use principle does not perfectly
anticipate entitlement assignment in solar regimes, water law
presents another alternative that may assist: the beneficial use
rules that govern prior appropriation jurisdictions. 94 In such
jurisdictions, water rights are granted on the first-in-time,
first-in-right principle to those users who first capture water
and put it to a beneficial use.95 The right only lasts for as long
as the use remains beneficial; if the owner does not use it bene-
ficially for a certain period of time, she loses her right, and the
right reverts back to the state.96 The concept of beneficial use
remains broadly defined; very few uses of water have been con-
clusively found to be non-beneficial. 97 Moreover, beneficial
uses do not assist with what may be the central task of an ini-
tial assignment of a solar right: the weighing of different uses.
Unlike riparian regimes, prior appropriation regimes allocate
rights primarily based on the timing of the assertion of the
right and not on the nature of the right itself. Prior appropria-
tion rules for water could not assist, for example, with weigh-
ing whether a solar collector that powers a hot tub is beneficial
(because solar collectors use clean energy) or non-beneficial
(because the collector is enabling an arguably non-essential
recreational activity). As is the case with the reasonable use
rules, beneficial use rules might not provide a ready-made solu-
tion for the grant of the initial entitlement in solar law.
However, by combining some aspects of these two major
strands of water law, we may be able to come to a workable so-
lution for the assignment of an initial entitlement in a solar
rights regime. Specifically, we can learn from riparian prin-
ciples the ranking and prioritization of certain uses in the
interest of the public good; from prior appropriation principles,
we can learn the notion that rights last only as long as uses are
beneficial and the first-in-time principle for similar uses (such
as competing solar collectors). Incorporating these ideas in a
94. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
95. See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 360-61 (2007) (describing prior appropriation regimes); Goble, supra
note 34, at 292 (emphasizing that water rights in prior appropriation regimes only
occur if a use is beneficial).
96. Polis, supra note 42, at 374 ("If an appropriator ceases to utilize all or part
of the appropriation right, with the intention of wholly or partially abandoning
that right, the appropriation is deemed abandoned to that extent.").
97. MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 95, at 360 (identifying Tulare Irrigation
Dist. v. Lindsay-Stratmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972, 1007 (Cal. 1935), as one
of the few cases narrowing the beneficial use principle because it deemed flooding
land to drive out gophers not to be a beneficial use).
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solar rights regime would respect the relativity of solar rights
and support a flexible array of legal options for the solar rights
seeker.
To articulate these concepts more fully, it is important to
recognize the kinds of competing uses that should be accommo-
dated in a solar rights regime. In some cases, one solar use-
that is, a use that could not exist without sunlight-could be
pitted directly against another solar use. In theory, the two
competing solar uses could both involve solar collectors, with
one neighbor erecting her solar collector in such a way that it
would obstruct the solar path to the collector of another. In
these situations, where the uses are equally beneficial and
equally reasonable, the prior appropriation first-in-time prin-
ciple may be most appropriately applied to give more weight to
the owner of the first-installed collector. The application of this
principle has not yet been tested, as no such disputes have
been reported in either the popular press or the courts. But so-
lar collectors are not the only solar use. As a more realistic ex-
ample of a dispute involving two solar uses, the New York
Times recently reported a dispute involving two neighbors-
one who used the sun to grow redwood trees in his backyard,
and the other who argued that the growth of the redwoods
blocked sunlight from reaching his solar collectors. 98 Both the
growing of trees and the use of solar collectors require sunlight,
and both uses benefit the environment. Although the com-
peting values were compellingly close, the state in which the
suit was brought, California, has enacted legislation that pri-
oritizes solar collectors over tree growth, and the owner of the
trees lost his battle in court. 99 In water law, the result might
have been different, as the redwood-growing use (a natural use)
might have received higher priority over the solar collector use
(arguably an artificial use). The statute's hierarchy of uses,
which protects the artificial use of the solar collector as a
reflection of the state's energy efficiency goals, represents one
of the few legislative attempts to address solar rights. The
hierarchy accounts at least in part for the relativity and flex-
ibility that this Article advocates.
98. Felicity Barringer, Trees Block Solar Panels, and a Feud Ends in Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2OO8/O4/O7/science/earth/O7red
wood.html?_r=l&oref=slogin.
99. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 25980-25986 (Deering 2007) (naming as a
public nuisance any tree or shrub which, during the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 2:00




While the redwood-solar collector case involved two solar
uses, non-solar uses-that is, uses that do not wholly rely on
sunlight for their existence-may also present challenges to a
solar rights regime. For example, the desire to develop proper-
ty or to build a structure to a certain height (both non-solar
uses as the term is used in this Article, although access to sun-
light, of course, may have a significant effect on property val-
ues) may be incompatible with a solar right awarded to a
neighbor for a solar collector use that prevents such develop-
ment from occurring. 100 In such cases, the value of the right
may change for each party depending on economic conditions or
other factors. If the neighbor owning the solar right was
granted the initial entitlement, the real estate developer could
potentially bargain with the neighbor to purchase that right.
Until the developer valued the right enough to set a price that
the neighbor would accept, the right would protect a socially
desirable use. A more difficult case might arise where the non-
solar use involves a critical community need-say, a children's
cancer center where no other such center existed for hundreds
of miles around. A well-formulated, ranked list might allow
critical community needs to supersede solar collector uses in
priority and allow changes to these exceptions over time.
The ranking of uses is a central feature of both riparian
and prior appropriation rules. Regardless of which body of law
a solar regime draws from, solar collector uses should be at the
top of any list of desirable uses. The public benefits of solar col-
lector uses are difficult to deny. 10 1 Solar collectors provide a
clean source of energy with minimal impact on the environ-
ment. Expansion of their use would reduce the American de-
pendency on fossil fuels and thereby reduce financial support to
groups and governments that have undermined American se-
curity abroad. Moreover, the costs of solar collectors relative to
the power they generate, as supplemented by government in-
centives, have decreased in recent years. 10 2 Indeed, the very
100. See Gregory Sergienko, Property Law and Climate Change, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2008, at 25, 27 (2008) ("Because the rising and set-
ting sun casts a long shadow, absolute priority for the solar developer would veto
many developments .... unjustifiably interfer[ing] with other property owners.").
101. See Bronin, supra note 4, at 1223 (summarizing the value of increased so-
lar collector usage to the United States as a whole).
102. Various industry studies show a significant cost decrease. See Ted Nesi,
Study: Solar 'Cheaper than Grid'by 2012, PROVIDENCE Bus. NEWS, Mar. 11, 2009,
http://www.pbn.comlstories/40807.html?sub -id=40807&print=l (citing JOONKI
SONG ET AL., THE TRUE COST OF SOLAR POWER: RACE TO $ 1/W, report available for
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fact that we so heavily subsidize solar collectors demonstrates
that their proliferation is a national priority. Yet they are
dramatically underutilized, with only 1 percent of our elec-
tricity supplied by solar collectors. 103 Solar rights must en-
courage investment in solar collectors through a policy prefe-
rence that gives the initial entitlement in a solar right to the
solar collector user.10 4 Spelling out such preferences in a sta-
tute, whether the statute is based on riparian or prior appropr-
iation principles, would be ideal.
The public policy approach to assigning initial entitle-
ments is superior to the cost-maximization approach, but it is
possible that both may reach the same result. To minimize
transaction costs, a legal regime should assign the initial en-
titlement to the party who values it most. Although no com-
prehensive study has precisely measured such benefits, a solar
right is valuable to a solar collector user for many quantifiable
reasons, including savings in energy costs and potential income
from selling electricity to neighbors and local utilities. With
the exception of agricultural uses, few if any other solar uses
have a quantifiable, commodifiable value. And in the case of
agricultural uses, unless the agricultural site is extremely
small (say, an urban rooftop), the award of a solar right to a
neighbor will not necessarily result in a dramatic decrease in
the productive viability of the site. It is easy to imagine, there-
fore, that a solar collector user (or potential user) would value
the right more than other solar users. The fact that so few us-
ers have negotiated and bargained for solar rights may indicate
that transaction costs raise the price of the rights too high or
that the initial entitlements assigned by our current laws are
by and large in the wrong place. As for non-solar uses, this Ar-
purchase at http://www.photonconsulting.comlthe-truecost-of-solar-power-race
-to-w.php#ExecutiveSummary, and describing a race to the bottom on prices);
businessGreen.com, Report: Solar Panel Prices to Plummet, (June 2, 2009),
http://www.businessgreen.comlbusiness-green/news/2243366/report-solar-panel-
prices (citing IC INSIGHTS, SOLAR ENERGY: GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY, report available for purchase at
http://www.icinsights.com/prodsrvs/specialstudies/solarenergy/solarenergy.html,
and concluding that prices will drop by a quarter this year alone).
103. Galbraith, supra note 9 ("Even with federal support and positive buzz, on-
ly a fraction of 1 percent of the electricity in the United States comes from solar
panels, leaving ample room for the market to grow.").
104. See KETTLES, supra note 11, at 1 (2008), available at http://www.solar
abcs.org/solaraccess/Solaraccess-full.pdf ("As our energy policies shift to advanc-
ing solar energy as a significant source of our energy portfolio, the conventional




ticle takes the position that non-solar uses should not be priori-
tized over solar collector uses in a solar rights regime, al-
though, of course, not every use of land can be anticipated by a
solar rights regime. After solar collector uses, solar rights
should be allocated to uses ranked by significance to the juris-
diction.
III. CREATING LEGAL HYBRIDS WITHIN THE NUMERUS
CLAUSUS
The allocation of the initial entitlement is only the first
step in determining how a solar rights regime might be
created. The second step is identifying how such an allocation
finds expression in the law. It would not be impossible to
create a new property form outside of the numerus clausus.
Several new property forms, such as the timeshare, have been
created over the last fifty years, joining standard forms like the
easement and the leasehold in the property canon. 10 5 As Nes-
tor Davidson has pointed out, the dynamism of the numerus
clausus, with respect to the addition and deletion of forms and
the content of the forms themselves, is often overlooked. 10 6 In
this case, however, creating a new property form is not neces-
sary, as an adequate solar rights regime may be created by in-
tegrating existing property forms. Scholars addressing the so-
lar rights issue two decades ago reached a consensus that an
integration of existing property forms is the only conceivable
way to achieve solar rights. 107
Today, their conclusion still resonates: the best solar rights
regime would combine and modify existing property forms to
provide several options to solar rights seekers. More specifical-
ly, a hybrid solar rights system should facilitate private agree-
ments by and among property owners and should authorize
105. See Davidson, supra note 15, at 1611.
106. Id. at 1600 (arguing that "[e]xisting accounts of the numerus clausus ei-
ther ignore this dynamic aspect or treat the content of the forms primarily as the
artifact of private ordering").
107. See, e.g., HAYES, supra note 39, at 4-9 (explaining the possibility that
governments could facilitate private agreements, protect solar access only in new
residential developments, remove barriers in existing land use controls, enact
state-level enabling legislation, add solar access elements to comprehensive plans,
use transferable development rights, rezone, adopt solar envelopes, enact state-
wide solar access laws, or enact federally mandated solar access laws); Lyden, su-
pra note 48, at 393 ("A private nuisance action, combined with a solar access
easement statute and land use planning legislation, is the ideal approach to solar
access.").
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government allocations of rights through permitting or zoning
schemes. This Part describes how such a solar rights regime
might provide for express agreements and, where bargaining is
unsuccessful, protect the initial entitlement through liability
rules, requiring the holders of solar rights (or the government)
to pay any burdened parties. Compensating deserving losers is
necessary to a functional and fair solar rights regime, and
different means of compensation may be required for different
communities. One approach to compensation in high-density
or highly regulated communities, where it may be most difficult
to establish a solar rights regime, is the governmental alloca-
tion of transferable development rights-privately tradable
credits which can be awarded to individual property owners.
A. Liability Rule Solutions
Without pushing for a new form in property law, this Ar-
ticle advocates an integrated approach using forms of express
agreements and governmental allocations already in our legal
repertoire. This integrated approach may allow for the priori-
tization of solar rights as a matter of policy, grant individuals
the ability to choose among various paths toward solar rights,
offset possible unjustified windfalls, and reduce costs for all
parties involved.
As noted in the companion piece to this Article, there are
three possible means of creating solar rights. 10 8 The first, ex-
press agreement, involves negotiations among two or more in-
dividuals (or groups of individuals), as allowed by law, which
result in some mutually agreeable allocation of solar rights.
The second, governmental allocation, involves government at
any level awarding a solar right to a private party through an
established program, such as a permit scheme or a zoning or-
dinance. The third, a court assignment of solar rights, involves
one party suing another to create a solar right based on
theories such as nuisance, prescriptive easements, or implied
easements. The companion piece concluded with the argument
that court assignments are "the least efficient and most costly
method of obtaining a solar right,"10 9 and create little but con-
fusion. 110 Accordingly, this Article proposes an approach that
108. Bronin, supra note 4, at 1221-22.
109. Id. at 1221.
110. See Lungren, supra note 41, at 186 ("The multiplicity of doctrines and con-
fusion of the common law pertaining to protection of solar access rights requires a
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avoids the courts and focuses instead on a hybrid system that
gives solar rights seekers the ability to choose from at least one
kind of express agreement, explicitly authorized by law, and at
least one government allocation scheme.
As a starting point, all jurisdictions should make provi-
sions for property owners to bargain to a mutually agreeable
solution. Because solar rights are property rights, any express
agreements that involve solar rights must be articulated using
forms such as easements, covenants, and leases-all within the
numerus clausus.111 Requirements for the drafting and format
of such forms are, by and large, articulated by state legisla-
tures. States often require, for example, that covenants be at-
tached to the deed of a legal parcel and recorded on the land
records kept by the local government. Although the need for
state guidance on the issue has become increasingly clear,
many state legislatures have failed to explicitly authorize the
use of even one form within the numerus clausus for solar
rights.
A more interesting question is what happens when parties
cannot agree to allocate solar rights among themselves. In this
circumstance, government should assign the initial entitlement
to a solar right to the highest-value solar user, with certain
protections that benefit the holder of that entitlement in case of
a dispute. Calabresi and Melamed addressed this question in
their now-famous article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral.11 2 Their article dis-
tinguished between assignments of entitlements and the as-
signments of modes of protecting those entitlements, asserting
that there are three modes of protection in a dispute: (1) a
property rule by which someone can only destroy an initial en-
titlement if the entitlement holder agrees to release it; (2) a
liability rule by which someone can destroy the initial entitle-
ment if he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for
it; and (3) an inalienability rule by which no one can destroy
the initial entitlement because transfer cannot occur even if
there is a willing buyer and seller. 113
definite frame of legislative reference establishing a foundation for confirmation of
property rights ....").
111. See Bronin, supra note 4, at 1225.
112. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
113. See id. at 1105-06.
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For our purposes, the key question is whether a property
rule or a liability rule is the most appropriate means of protect-
ing the initial entitlement. With liability rules, one party can
force the result that she wants, and the other party is compen-
sated for his or her damages. Such a result has the advantage
of allowing one party to have its way, while softening the blow
to the other party. Liability rules become sensible when the
identity of the cheapest-cost avoider is known or when one of
the parties should receive the initial entitlement for policy rea-
sons. Property rules can help to protect subjective values and
owner autonomy-they do not capture values that are not con-
sidered in court-determined prices. Property rules can also
minimize administrative costs and more strongly protect the
rights of the entitlement holders. Numerous scholars have de-
bated which of these two rules costs less, primarily through the
transaction cost framework. 114
Although some have pointed out that property rules may
be more prevalent in property law than liability rules, 115 liabil-
ity rules make more sense in the solar rights context. As solar
rights are themselves relative, the remedy must be relative.
Moreover, liability rules allow for compensation of losers, who
may be greatly affected by a solar rights scheme. Key to the
success of these liability rules is a related ranking of competing
uses, drawing from water law principles described in Part I.B.
A few examples of liability rules in a solar context may
illuminate why these rules work so well in protecting initial en-
titlements. A law might, for example, allow a property owner
with a highly-ranked solar use to create an affirmative ease-
ment over a noncooperating landowner's property for solar
access. Such a scheme may not be so far-fetched, as approx-
imately half of the states allow private taking of easements by
landlocked property owners, as long as such owners pay just
114. See Driesen & Ghosh, supra note 75, at 68-69 ("Scholars debate which
rule creates the lowest transaction costs, and therefore the least impediment to
bargaining around inefficient judicial decisions. Implicitly, these scholars endorse
the view that the choice between property and liability rules should reduce the
transaction costs of bargaining around judicial decisions.").
115. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1732 (2004) (explaining that property law primarily involves property rules,
not liability rules, and that "[riecently the pro-liability rule literature has chal-
lenged these positions by arguing that liability rules would be superior to property
rules even in securing the traditionally cited benefits of property").
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compensation to the burdened landowner. 116 While this first
example involved a privately-created easement, the approach
also works in governmental allocation schemes. Iowa and Wis-
consin, for example, have both enacted laws that allow a pri-
vate party to apply to an administrative board for the creation
of easements without the burdened landowners' consent. 117
One of the key elements of these states' legislation is the re-
quirement that the private party applicants pay compensation
to burdened property owners. 118 In each scenario, the protec-
tion of the initial entitlement via a liability rule allows the so-
lar right holder to exercise her rights while also compensating
the loser at least something for her losses. A property rule
would be too harsh on prospective losers, allowing the winner
to take all. A property rule might, for example, allow one prop-
erty owner the absolute right to erect a solar collector without
having to compensate her neighbor; the reverse property rule
would allow a neighbor to prevent the same property owner
from erecting her solar collector and give the property owner no
recourse against the neighbor. For the reasons described in
Part I.A., using property rules would be detrimental to a fair
solar rights regime.
In any regime, flexibility is very important: individuals
must be allowed to choose among different possible paths to so-
lar rights. There may be no "one size fits all" approach to the
allocation of solar rights. Just as there are multiple regimes
governing the use of water, which vary according to region,
there may be reason to apply different solar rights regimes in
different types of settings-according to density, rural charac-
ter, and land use, for example. It may be difficult, for example,
to enact solar access laws in places where land use controls
change frequently, development is very dense, disparities al-
ready exist in building heights, or vegetation is not regu-
lated. 119 Default rules should be carefully crafted to allow for
116. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 95, at 986 (indicating that about half of
the states allow for such forced easement statutes); see, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE §
8.24.010 (2009).
117. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 564A.1-.9 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0403
(West 2007).
118. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 564A.5(3) (West 2008) (setting board-adjudged
compensation at "the difference between the fair market value of the property
prior to and after granting the solar access easement"); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
66.0403(5)(b) (West 2007) (allowing local governments to establish, as a condition
for granting a permit, "requirements for the compensation of persons affected by
the granting of the permit").
119. See HAYES, supra note 39, at 24-26.
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creative alternate solutions and should create a baseline that
facilitates the achievement of public policy goals.
B. The Compensation Mechanism
For a solar regime to be politically viable, adequate and
fair compensation must be paid to individuals burdened by
another party's receipt of a solar right. Compensation, of
course, can take many forms-money, tradable credits, the
permission to engage in certain activities-and can be calcu-
lated in many different ways. For simplicity's sake, this Article
uses the fair market value of the affected property as the
measure. Whatever form the compensation takes, efficiency of-
ten requires that compensation be paid to "losers" (that is, bur-
dened parties). In property law, the most widely accepted
measure of efficiency is the Kaldor-Hicks model: a change in al-
location of resources is efficient if those who gain from the
change value their gains in an amount greater than the losers
value their losses. 120 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency requires the pos-
sibility that compensation could be made from the winners (or
perhaps a third party) to the losers. 121 If the award of a solar
right keeps a neighbor from disposing of her property as she
sees fit, efficiency could be achieved by the solar right holder
compensating the neighbor for her inability to use the property
as she desired.
Compensation schemes must necessarily differ depending
on the characteristics of the benefited and burdened properties.
The amount may depend on the scale of the solar use. For ex-
ample, a solar-powered water heater may require only the
smallest of solar panels, and the limitation on a neighbor's use
of her property may be very minor. 122 Similarly, in low-density
120. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-15 (7th
ed. 2007). An alternative measure of efficiency, Pareto optimal efficiency, signi-
fies that a change in an allocation of resources is efficient if at least one individual
is better off, without making any other individual worse off. See id. at 12-13.
This measure of efficiency is not typically used in property law because property
disputes almost always produce losers; very often, the loser is made worse off,
without compensation. Although this Article disregards Pareto optimal efficiency,
a compensation mechanism that at least resulted in losers' maintaining their pre-
solar-rights-award status might qualify the solar rights regimes advocated herein
to be deemed efficient under Pareto optimal rules.
121. Id. at 13.
122. Note that drawing a line as to which size solar collectors merit protection
and payment and which do not would be too costly, so this Article would allow for
any size solar collector to have the same treatment.
[Vol. 80
MODERN LIGHTS
or undeveloped areas, compensation may be relatively small
because the award of a solar right might not actually create
significant burdens. For these areas, compensation may most
easily be factored into the price of the solar right itself and paid
directly by the holder of the solar right. For higher-density
areas, the compensation mechanism is more complicated. It is
important to note that in some cases-even in high-density
communities-compensation may not be owed at all if the
activity in which the burdened party is prohibited from engag-
ing would not have raised the value of her property if she had
been allowed to undertake such activity. For example, a
neighbor who was prohibited from erecting a giant treehouse in
her backyard because the treehouse would block an adjacent
solar collector would not necessarily be owed compensation if
the erection of the treehouse would not raise her property's
value. In other words, if a burdened party's loss is measured
by fair market value (and not the subjective value the party
places on her burden), then sometimes the burdened party will
be owed nothing. 123
However compensation is calculated, identifying the party
who pays the compensation may be a difficult proposition.
Burdened parties may turn to the government for compensa-
tion. Government compensation may, however, be politically
infeasible. Even if the allocation of the solar right provides
some public benefit, voters may not want government to so di-
rectly subsidize private parties' solar rights. The law of tak-
ings allows (and, in fact, requires) government to compensate
private property owners when a government action has effected
a taking. 124 In that circumstance, the party doing the taking
(and presumably also the benefitting, albeit on behalf of the
general public) is government itself. When it comes to solar
rights, disputes will most often involve private parties, not pub-
lic entities.
As an alternative to government compensation, the party
who benefits most from the allocation of a solar right may be
tasked with payment. This assignment of payment, too, may
be worrisome. If the benefitting party owns a solar collector,
123. Even if no compensation is due under a fair market value analysis, it may
nonetheless be important to provide a small amount of compensation to offset ad-
ministrative costs of the burdened party or mitigate emotional damage incident to
the imposition of the burden.
124. Note that advocates for private takings, that is, condemnation by private
parties, have begun to emerge. See, e.g., Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 517 (2009).
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then it is very likely that she will make the initial investment
in the installation of the solar collector at a financial loss. Add-
ing compensation to neighbors to her installation costs may
dampen solar collector investment, except in circumstances
where the rules on compensation are very clear and the
amount of compensation is very small. At the same time, re-
quiring that private parties directly compensate burdened par-
ties may skew development incentives. On the positive side,
property owners in low-density areas, who would otherwise be
interested in installing solar collectors, may race to do so to
avoid having to pay compensation if the area becomes more de-
veloped. In addition, liability rules requiring benefited parties
to pay might thwart socially undesirable solar collector uses-
that is, collectors used to offset the cost of development that, in
the aggregate, harms society more than the energy savings
helps it. For example, the cheap energy produced by solar col-
lectors might be used to subsidize sprawl, whose impact on the
environment in terms of increased demands on non-electricity
utility infrastructure (such as roads or water lines) is signifi-
cant. Liability rules imposing costs on the creators of such de-
velopments may cause them to think twice about their invest-
ment. 125 On the negative side, property owners who fear
undercompensation may engage in a race to overdevelop their
properties, building higher or taking up more area than they
might otherwise so as to vest their rights to the detriment of
future solar collector users.
One possible solution for letting the market take care of
compensation in high-density areas, particularly in situations
where a solar user who receives the right is the winner and a
neighbor who wishes to develop is the loser, are transferable
development rights ("TDRs"). Local or state governments may
allocate TDRs to compensate property owners who may be bur-
dened by solar access regimes such as permit systems or zoning
ordinances.
In brief, a TDR gives one property owner the ability to con-
vey certain rights to develop her parcel to someone else, usual-
ly a neighbor in the immediate vicinity, for use on that person's
parcel. 126 Put another way, TDRs are marketable, quantifiable
125. In reality, the number of cases where solar collectors would be used to
facilitate socially undesirable development where it would not otherwise occur is
very small.
126. See Goble, supra note 38, at 127 ("In a TDR system, land ownership is di-
vided into two components: ownership of the physical land and ownership of the
[Vol. 80
MODERN LIGHTS
units of development potential, which may be granted to a
property owner by a governmental entity to compensate the
property owner for restrictions (such as conservation or preser-
vation restrictions), which that governmental entity has placed
on the property. These rights represent the difference between
the maximum development permissible for the original parcel
and a lesser amount of development permissible under restric-
tions specific to the parcel. Under typical TDR regimes, the
property whose owner obtains TDRs may be developed to a
greater extent than existing laws would otherwise permit. Al-
though governments initially allocate TDRs, the value of TDRs
is determined by private parties who may trade or sell them.
Such rights are explicitly authorized in about half of the
states. 127 It may be important to note that although the Su-
preme Court has considered cases involving TDR regimes
twice, it has never ruled on the constitutionality of TDRs them-
selves. 128
To be sure, TDRs may be difficult to implement. One scho-
lar has summarized the issues as follows: "TDR proposals in-
clude major administrative and bureaucratic procedures. The
administering authority must identify the sites from which the
development rights . . . [have been] transferred. A basis must
be determined for selection" and "[t]he authority must identify
where the development rights may be transferred."1 29 Aside
from the logistical concerns, TDRs would not necessarily be
development potential traditionally associated with land. Under this approach,
an initial level of permissible development is specified . . . . If the local zoning
board determines that a tract of land may be developed to a density lower than
the standard, the owner of the land thus designated is permitted to sell the unus-
able development potential.").
127. Andrew J. Miller, Transferable Development Rights in the Constitutional
Landscape: Has Penn Central Failed to Weather the Storm?, 39 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 459, 468 & n.49 (1999) (indicating that twenty-two states authorize TDRs).
128. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 728 (1997)
("[Wle have no occasion to decide, and we do not decide, whether or not these
TDR's may be considered in deciding the issue whether there has been a taking in
this case, as opposed to the issue whether just compensation has been afforded for
such a taking."); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978)
(declining to decide on the question of "whether the transferable development
rights afforded appellants constitute 'just compensation' within the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment").
129. SANDY F. KRAEMER, SOLAR LAW: PRESENT AND FUTURE, WITH PROPOSED
FORMS 160 (1978); cf. Jesse L. Matuson, Note, A Legislative Approach to Solar
Access: Transferable Development Rights, 13 NEW ENG. L REV. 835, 854 (1978)
(arguing that likely transferees could include property owners outside of the area
burdened by the solar regime, who own "land where their use will not be objec-
tionable due to a solar permit").
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valuable in all locales: they work best in dense urban areas,
where land is scarce and values are high, because in those sit-
uations, the ability to build more densely than normally al-
lowed is especially valuable. Some scholars have indicated that
even where they are implemented, TDR programs do not gen-
erate much activity in trading development rights, and the ac-
tivity that is generated does not necessarily achieve the sub-
stantive goals of the programs. 130 Criticisms of TDRs are se-
rious and many have merit. Yet in the absence of alternative
creative means of compensating losers in dense areas where so-
lar regimes are perhaps most difficult to enact, TDRs remain a
useful possible route to achieving efficiency and compensating
losers in a fair manner.
Indeed, though seldom used, TDRs have been effective in
controlling development in large, densely populated cities, in
environmentally sensitive areas, in areas that house endan-
gered species, and in historic neighborhoods. 131 In the historic
preservation context, for example, a property owner might find
that a local preservation ordinance prevents her from con-
structing a second-story addition to her one-story historic
house, even though the zoning ordinance would otherwise allow
homes "with heights up to two stories" in that zone. Instead of
simply denying her petition for an addition, the local preserva-
tion board might allocate a TDR consisting of "one story of de-
velopment" for her to sell to neighbors whose properties do not
fall under historic preservation review. A neighboring owner of
a two-story new home, who would otherwise be unable to con-
struct a third story because of the two-story restriction of the
zoning ordinance, could purchase the TDR and construct a
third story. A TDR thus has great value to both its giver and
its recipient. Moreover, TDRs function to save restrictions on
development from unconstitutional takings challenges, because
they represent "just compensation" for regulatory restrictions
130. Ari D. Bruening, The TDR Siren Song: The Problems with Transferable
Development Rights Programs and How to Fix Them, 23 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L.
423, 424 (2008) (citing statistics which demonstrate this point).
131. See W. Wade Berryhill & William H. Parcell III, Guaranteeing Solar
Access in Virginia, 13 U. RICH. L. REV. 423, 442 (1979) (observing that "[t]his
sparsely used concept has been applied to control development in larger cities and
to preserve environmentally critical areas and historical sites"); Miller, supra note
127, at 466 ("TDRs are being used to protect drinking water supplies, endangered
and threatened species' habitat, and valuable agricultural land .... ).
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on property. 132 More broadly, TDRs counteract the losing par-
ty's negative perception of the windfall received by the winner
in other types of governmental allocations.
Although TDRs have been used in a few locales, they have
never been used in the solar context. In theory, they could be
given to property owners barred from building because of solar
access rights obtained by another property owner. 133 The TDR
could provide the burdened property owner with the ability to
transfer a right to develop that represents the difference
between the rights that the property owner had under the prior
rules and the lesser rights she now has under the solar access
regime. In the imagined scenario, a TDR could be issued to a
property owner upon a petition and hearing to determine the
size of her burden. 134 By adjusting the TDR to the size of the
burden, the psychological impact of excessive windfalls to the
benefited party could be mitigated, while simultaneously pre-
venting the opposite result (unjust burdens). 135 In the ideal
situation, TDRs could resolve inequities among landowners
that result from governmental allocations of solar rights by
providing some compensation to burdened landowners. 136
132. The Penn Central takings case has influenced lower courts to uphold local
governments' uses of TDRs even though the Supreme Court declined to opine on
whether the TDRs represented "just compensation" under the Takings Clause in
that case. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 122; see also MILLER ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 10 (explaining that TDRs might avoid takings challenges but
that takings challenges "would probably only arise in commercial and industrial
zones where a building could be higher without shading its neighbor, but where
expansion is constrained by a development rights restriction"); Matuson, supra
note 129, at 838 (arguing that in the solar rights context TDRs could "prevent[ ] a
solar access law from being invalidated as an unconstitutional 'taking without
just compensation' due to restraints on an adjoining landowner's ability to in-
tensely develop his land").
133. See HAYES, supra note 39, at 208 (suggesting that TDRs could be applica-
ble "[w]here there is no present shading, but shading would occur if structures
were built up to present zoning limits" and "[wihere the authorized but unused
density in a zone adjoining the zone with solar units ... [is] close enough to block
solar access"); Goble, supra note 38, at 127-28 (describing a system of solar zoning
whereby "[a]n owner who wished to construct a building in ... [ways] that would
obstruct more than the base level of insolation would be required to purchase
enough ... [TDRs] to cover the amount of obstruction above the base level").
134. See Matuson, supra note 129, at 871 (suggesting that a landowner who
attends a hearing and "who can show 'substantial reliance interests' should be
given transferable development rights").
135. Cf. MILLER ET AL., supra note 17, at 9 (identifying another unjustified
windfall issue addressed by TDRs: "unjustified windfalls to the owners of lots al-
lowed more intense development").
136. See JOHN COSTONIS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION
WORKSHOP ON SOLAR ENERGY AND THE LAW, AN INTERIM REPORT SUBMITTED TO
THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION 20 (1975) (suggesting that TDRs "may
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CONCLUSION
This Article concludes by considering again why a natural
resource as valuable as sunlight has gone virtually unregulated
in the United States. As the preceding discussion makes clear,
one explanation might well be the complexities involved with
the allocation and administration of solar rights. With some
creativity, these legal complexities may be overcome. Other
obstacles, too, may be surmounted, as political forces have be-
gun to focus on maximizing the social utility of natural re-
sources. In the case of sunlight, political attention has concen-
trated on the solar collector, a clean energy generator that can
help free the American economy from its dependence on fossil
fuels. Rapidly deteriorating environmental conditions have in-
spired government to actively promote their use, and a clear so-
lar rights regime can work hand in hand with government in-
centives to facilitate their adoption.
This Article, drawing from various theories and bodies of
law, has identified several key considerations for developing a
solar rights regime. It advocates an approach that recognizes
sunlight's natural qualities, assigns the initial entitlement to
the property owner whose use of sunlight will most benefit so-
ciety, and works within existing legal forms. Whatever form
solar rights take, the default rules matter both to the individu-
als seeking guidance as to their rights and obligations, and to
those who work around the defaults. In offering a fresh per-
spective on the solar rights dilemma, this Article aims to in-
spire others to reengage in this critically important question.
provide a basis for permitting a landowner not permitted to achieve certain densi-
ties to receive the cash equivalent for his loss"); Berryhill & Parcell III, supra note
131, at 443 (arguing that TDRs address inequities among landowners).
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